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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Zoning Referenda-Mandatory
Referenda on All Municipal Land Use Changes Do Not Violate
the Due Process Clause. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter-
prises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358 (1976).
Forest City Enterprises, Inc., a real estate development company,
owned eight acres zoned for "light industrial" use in the City of
Eastlake, Ohio.' In May 1971 the company applied to Eastlake's
City Planning Commission to have the parcel rezoned for multi-
family high-rise apartment use.' The Commission recommended
approval and the City Council amended the zoning ordinance ac-
cordingly.3 While this zoning ordinance was under consideration,
the voters of Eastlake amended the City Charter4 to provide for a
mandatory referendum on all land use changes.5 Under the new
1. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358, 2360 (1976).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 2360-61. The ordinance was amended pursuant to the Codified Ordinances of the
City of Eastlake which provide:
Whenever the public health, safety, necessity, convenience, comfort, prosperity or
general welfare, and compliance with the Master Plan or good zoning practice justify
the action, and after consideration by the Planning Commission, Council may change
by ordinance the districts or the regulations established by this Zoning Code, subject
to the provisions of Article VIII, Section Three of the Charter.
EASTLAKE, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 1165.02, reprinted in Appendix to Respondent's Brief
at 25.
4. The voters themselves initiated the amendment by circulating petitions to place the
proposal on the ballot in the November 1971 general election. They adopted the Charter
amendment on November 2, 1971. The City Council enacted the rezoning ordinance on
December 28, 1971. Forest City Enterprises Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 188
n.1, 324 N.E.2d 740, 742 n.1 (1975), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 2358 (1976).
The Ohio Constitution guaranteed the Eastlake voters' power to make such an amendment:
The initiative and referendum are hereby reserved to the people of each municipality
on all questions which such municipalities may now or hereafter be authorized by law
to control by legislative action ....
OHIO CONST. art. II, § If (1955).
Pursuant to the Constitution, the Eastlake City Charter provides:
Ordinances and other measures may be proposed by initiative petition and adopted
by election, and ordinances and other measures adopted by the Council shall be
subject to referendum, to the extent and in the manner now or hereafter provided by
this Charter or the Laws of Ohio.
EASTLAKE, OHIO, CITY CHARTER art. III, § 1 (1971), reprinted in Appendix to Brief for City of
Parma as Amicus Curiae at 35.
5. The amendment provides in pertinent part:
That any change to the existing land uses or any change whatsoever to any ordinance,
or the enactment of any ordinance referring to other regulations controlling the devel-
opment of land . . . cannot be approved unless and until it shall have been submitted
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provision, no change could take effect until 55 percent of the voters
approved it in an election paid for by the party seeking the change.'
The company attempted to proceed with its plans, but the Plan-
ning Commission denied its application for a necessary permit be-
cause the voters had not ratified the zoning change.7 When the city
scheduled a special election, the company sought a declaratory
judgment' that the mandatory referendum procedure was an uncon-
stitutional delegation of legislative power to the people9 in violation
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.'" The Su-
preme Court of Ohio, reversing two lower courts, II found the referen-
dum requirement unconstitutional." The United States Supreme
Court reversed and remanded, holding that a referendum may not
be characterized as a delegation of power. 3
to the Planning Commission, for approval or disapproval. That in the event the city
council shall approve any of the preceding changes, or enactments, whether approved
or disapproved by the Planning Commission . . . it shall not be effective, but it shall
be mandatory that the same be approved by a 55% favorable vote of all votes cast of
the qualified electors of the City of Eastlake at the next regular municipal election, if
one shall occur not less than sixty (60) or more than one hundred and twenty (120)
days after its passage, otherwise at a special election falling on the generally estab-
lished day of the primary election. Said issue shall be submitted to the electors of the
City only after approval of a change of an existing land use by the Council for an
applicant, and the applicant agrees to assume all costs of the election and post bond
with the City Auditor in an amount estimated by the County Auditor or the Board of
Elections proportionate with any other issues that may be on the ballot at the same
time.
EASTLAKE, OHIO, CITY CHARTER art. VIII, § 3 (1971), reprinted in Appendix to Brief for City
of Parma as Amicus Curiae at 69-70.
6. Id.
7. 96 S. Ct. at 2361.
8. At the time of filing his complaint, plaintiff also sought to enjoin the Board of Elections
from holding the referendum. Brief for City of Parma as Amicus Curiae at 12. However, the
Court did not hold a hearing until after the election had taken place and the voters had
defeated the amendment. Id. at 16.
9. 96 S. Ct. at 2361.
10. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
11. 41 Ohio St. 2d at 188, 324 N.E.2d at 742.
12. The Court of Common Pleas upheld both the mandatory referendum and the 55
percent requirement but held unconstitutional the provision requiring the party seeking the
change to pay the costs of the election. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. Forest City
Enterprises, Inc. v. Eastlake, No. 72 Civ. 0219 (Lake County C.P., Oct. 27, 1972), aff'd, No.
263 (Ct. App., July 23, 1973). Appendix to Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 39-47. The City
of Eastlake did not cross appeal the lower courts' judgment on the election costs provision.
Therefore, neither the Ohio Supreme Court, 41 Ohio St. 2d at 189 n.2, 324 N.E.2d at 742 n.2,
nor the United States Supreme Court on certiorari, 96 S. Ct. at 2361 n.3, considered the
provision's validity.
13. 96 S. Ct. at 2361.
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In early twentieth century America, the first enactments of zoning
ordinances provoked lively constitutional debate." The Supreme
Court settled the controversy in 1926 when it held that properly
drawn zoning ordinances are a valid exercise of the states' police
power.' 5 With the validity of zoning decided, disputes soon arose
over who should ultimately control the zoning process. Property
owners, realizing that the adoption or amendment of a zoning ordi-
nance could directly, and sometimes dramatically, affect their lives
and property," asserted their right to control by invoking initiative
and referendum processes." However, city planners, and some
courts and legislators have favored either denial or limitation of
local residents' power to control zoning decisions.'8
State courts have often resolved this conflict on the basis of statu-
tory interpretation rather than constitutional principles.'9 For ex-
ample, in most jurisdictions only legislative acts are subject to refer-
14. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390-91 (1926); 8 E. McQuIL-
LIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.05 (3rd ed. 1965).
15. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
16. The impact of zoning is apparent. It can affect or determine tax rates, property values,
the amount of open spaces, aesthetic characteristics, environmental quality, and a variety of
other factors. See generally Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
17. Initiative is defined as the power of the people, acting independently, to propose
legislation to be adopted or rejected by a direct vote of the electorate. In a referendum, the
people accept or reject a law already enacted by the legislature or referred to them by the
legislature. 42 AM. JUR. 2d Initiative and Referendum § 1 (1969). See also 5 MCQUILLIN, supra
note 14, §§ 16.52-.53 (3rd ed. 1969).
In the late nineteenth century, the adoption of initiative and referendum statutes was a
major goal of political reformers seeking to end political corruption by giving the populace
direct control over the lawmaking process. See generally J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN
LAW 37-39 (1950); Note, Limitations on Initiative and Referendum, 3 STAN. L. REV. 497
(1951). South Dakota, in 1898, was the first state to enact an initiative and referendum
statute. State ex rel. Wagner v. Summers, 33 S.D. 40, 47, 144 N.W. 730, 731 (1913). Within
a decade, many states followed suit. LaFleur v. Frost, 146 Me. 270, 281, 80 A.2d 407, 413
(1951).
18. See notes 20-22 infra, and accompanying text.
19. Municipalities have no inherent power to hold a referendum or to enact zoning ordi-
nances. See 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 3.07 (1968); 5 MCQUILLIN, supra note
14, § 16.49; 8 MCQUILLIN, supra note 14, § 25.35; 1 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND
PLANNING, §§ 2.01[31-2.02[1i (4th ed. 1975). The existence and extent of municipal referen-
dum powers depends upon a state's constitution, statutes and charters. These vary considera-
bly among the states. 1 ANDERSON, supra, §§ 3.01-12; 5 MCQUILLIN, supra note 14, §§ 16.49-
.50; 1 RATHKOPF, supra, §§ 2.02[1]-[3]. Every state has enacted a zoning enabling statute,
many of which are based on the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act drafted by the United
States Department of Commerce in 1921 and revised in 1926. 1 ANDERSON, supra, § 3.11.
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endum. 0 Some state courts, concluding that rezoning a piece of
property was an administrative rather than a legislative act,2" held
that the voters had no right to a referendum with respect to rezon-
ing. Some courts have decided that a popular referendum on zoning
changes is inconsistent with the statutory requirement that zoning
be "in accordance with a comprehensive plan."2 Where courts or
legislatures have not limited direct citizen control of land use deci-
sions, affected landowners have raised constitutional objections to
various popular land control procedures. 3
The earliest Supreme Court cases attacking the constitutionality
of citizen control did not involve referenda.24 The challenged ordi-
20. See, e.g., West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 460-61, 221 N.W.2d 303, 304 (1974);
Kelley v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 321, 75 N.W.2d 713, 714 (1956); Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d
1, 394 P.2d 808 (1964); see also 42 AM. JUR. 2d Initiative and Referendum § 11 (1969). The
need for efficiency in day-to-day government operations justifies the exclusion of administra-
tive and executive acts from the referendum process. The availability of referendum on every
measure and act could prevent the implementation of broad policies and plans previously
adopted and could cause unacceptable delays. 42 AM. JUR. 2d, supra; 1 RATHKOPF, supra note
19, § 3.
21. Traditionally, an act is "legislative" if it "prescribes a new policy or plan" and "ad-
ministrative" if it "merely carries out the policy or purpose already declared by the legislative
body." 5 MCQUILLIN, supra note 14, § 16.55; accord, West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458,
221 N.W.2d 303 (1974); State v. Straham, 374 S.W.2d 127 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1963); City of
Billings v. Nore, 148 Mont. 96, 417 P.2d 458 (1966); Kelley v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d
713 (1956); Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Mkts., Inc., 89 Nev. 533, 516 P.2d 1234 (1974);
Hilltop Realty v. City of South Euclid, 110 Ohio App. 535, 164 N.E.2d 180 (1960); Denman
v. Quin, 116 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
Although most states apply the same test, they do not always reach the same result. The
split of authority among the states on the question whether rezoning ordinances are adminis-
trative or legislative is clearly illustrated in Eastlake. Both the majority and the dissent
marshalled many cases to support the desired classification. 96 S. Ct. at 2362, 2367, 2370-71.
22. Section 3 of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act requires that zoning ordinances
be drawn "in accordance with a comprehensive plan." Reprinted in 3 RATHKOPF, supra note
19, 100-1 (3rd ed. 1972). State courts have interpreted this requirement in a variety of ways.
See generally Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 470-71, 235 N.E.2d 897, 901-02, 288 N.Y.S.2d
888, 894-95 (1968); E. HAAR, "IN ACCORDANCE WITH A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN," 68 HARV. L. REV.
1154 (1955). During the last decade, there has been a marked trend toward more stringent
planning requirements. See, e.g., Fontaine v. Board of County Comm'rs, 493 P.2d 670, 671
(Colo. App. 1971); Green v. City Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 340 A.2d 852, 856-57, aff'd sub
nom. Sea Colony Inc. v. Green, 344 A.2d 386 (Del. 1975); Dalton v. City & County of Hono-
lulu, 51 Ha. 400, 412-17, 462 P.2d 199, 207-09 (1969); City of Louisville v. Kavanaugh, 495
S.W.2d 502, 505 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 468, 469, 235 N.E.2d 897,
900, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888, 893 (1968); Baker v. City of Milwaukie, 533 P.2d 772, 774-79 (Ore.
1975); Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1, 394 P.2d 808 (1964).
23. See notes 25-54 infra and accompanying text.
24. Washington ex rel. Seattle v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928); Thomas Cusack Co. v.
Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
CASE NOTES
nances delegated to some property owners the power to impose land
use restrictions on their neighbors. In Eubank v. Richmond," a
Virginia statute authorized local municipalities to enact building
regulations." Pursuant to this statute, a Richmond city ordinance
provided that whenever two-thirds of the property owners on any
street requested the establishment of a building line, the Committee
on Streets would establish the line in accord with their wishes." The
Court invalidated the ordinance as an unlawful delegation of legisla-
tive power 8 because it left, 9
no discretion in the committee on streets as to whether the street line shall
or shall not be established in a given case .... The statute and ordinance,
while conferring the power on some proper holders to virtually control and
dispose of the property rights of others, creates no standard by which
the power thus given is to be exercised. . . . [T]he property holders . . .
may do so solely for their own interest or even capriciously.
In Washington ex rel. Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge,3° the Supreme
Court invalidated a Seattle ordinance3' amending the city's compre-
hensive zoning plan to permit construction of an enlarged philan-
thropic home. The city enacted the ordinance subject to the ap-
proval of the owners of two-thirds of the property within 400 feet of
the proposed building.32 Unlike Eubank, in which the Committee on
Streets did not act until requested, the legislators in Roberge ini-
tially determined that the amendment was in the public interest
and acted accordingly. 3 Nevertheless, they vested final decision-
making authority in a minority of the surrounding property owners.
Since there was no provision for review, the neighbors' decision was
final, even if made for arbitrary or selfish reasons.
34
During the period between Eubank and Roberge, the Court dis-
tinguished the situation in which zoning ordinances granted prop-
erty owners the power to remove, rather than to impose, property
25. 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
26. Id. at 140-41.
27. Id. at 141.
28. Id. at 144.
29. Id. at 143-44.
30. 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
31. Id. at 122.
32. Id. at 118.
33. Id. at 121.
34. Id. at 122.
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restrictions. In Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago,35 the chal-
lenged ordinance forbade erection of billboards in residential areas
but allowed a majority of the property owners on a street to remove
the prohibition." Relying on Eubank, plaintiff claimed an unlawful
delegation of legislative power 7.3 The Court upheld the ordinance,
noting that it did not confer any legislative power. 38 Instead, it
merely made a duly enacted law subject to modification by a major-
ity of those who would be most affected. Furthermore, delegation of
power to remove a restriction could only benefit the plaintiff since
the absolute prohibition of billboards would prevail in the absence
of this power. 9
These early decisions established the principle that standardless
delegations of power to impose restrictions on the property rights of
others violated the due process clause. However, the challenged
procedures in these cases were not referenda. In cases specifically
involving referenda courts have taken a different approach.
Federal courts have decided only a few cases challenging the con-
stitutionality of referendum procedures. Most did not involve pri-
vate property rights" and only one court of appeals case asserted a
due process claim.4 The decisions consistently affirm, with one ex-
ception,4" the validity and inherent democratic qualities of the refer-
endum procedure. 3 James v. Valtierral4 is illustrative. The Supreme
35. 242 U.S. 526 (1917).
36. Id. at 527-28.
37. Id. at 531.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 530.
40. See cases cited note 43 infra.
41. Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization (SASSO) v. Union City, 424 F.2d
291 (9th Cir. 1970).
42. A referendum statute is invalid if it conflicts with fundamental constitutional guaran-
tees. In Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), the Court invalidated a mandatory referen-
dum ordinance which created a racial classification in violation of the equal protection clause.
Id. at 392-93.
43. The first cases to reach the United States Supreme Court challenging the validity of
referendum and initiative laws asserted a violation of article IV, section 4 of the United States
Constitution which guarantees to every state a republican form of government. Pacific States
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); Kiernan v. Portland, 223 U.S. 151 (1912). The
Court dismissed both cases for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the issues presented were
political and governmental, and therefore solely within the scope of Congressional power. 223
U.S. at 151, 223 U.S. at 163-64 (alternative holding). See also Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hilde-
brant, 241 U.S. 565, 570 (1915). More recently, federal courts have asserted jurisdiction in
cases challenging referenda on equal protection grounds. They have characterized referenda
[Vol. V
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Court upheld a California constitutional amendment mandating
voter approval of any municipal low income housing project. 5 Plain-
tiffs claimed that the provision created an unconstitutional classifi-
cation based on wealth." The Court stated that "[p]rovisions for
referendums [sic] demonstrate devotion to democracy. . . . [Ilt
gives [the people of the community] a voice in decisions that will
affect the future development of their own community." 7
Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization (SASSO) v.
Union City48 considered whether a referendum on rezoning is incom-
patible with the procedural safeguards required by the due process
clause." The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff's due process conten-
tion did not present a substantial constitutional question. 0 Plain-
tiff, SASSO, sought and obtained rezoning of a particular tract of
land for the construction of federally financed low and moderate
income housing.5' Local citizens petitioned for a referendum and
defeated the rezoning ordinance. Relying on Eubank and Roberge,2
SASSO claimed that "the referendum process destroys the neces-
sary procedural safeguards upon which a municipality's power to
zone is based and subjects zoning decisions to the bias, caprice and
self-interest of the voter."5 The court refused to apply the Eubank
and Roberge reasoning to the referendum process:
A referendum . . . is far more than an expression of ambiguously founded
neighborhood preference. It is the city itself legislating through its voters -
an exercise by the voters of their traditional right through direct legislation
to override the views of their elected representatives as to what serves the
public interest.
as valid divisions of legislative power between the state and the people which, if founded on
neutral principles, should be free from federal constitutional restraint. See James v. Valtierra,
402 U.S. 137, 141-42 (1971); Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 417 F.2d 321, 324 (6th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 980, rehearing denied, 397 U.S. 1059 (1970); Spaulding v. Blair, 403 F.2d
862, 863-64 (4th Cir. 1968).
44. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
45. Id. at 143.
46. Id. at 139.
47. Id. at 141, 143. For a less enthusiastic appraisal of the democratic qualities of refer-
enda, see 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW 90 n.134 (1974).
48. 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).
49. Id. at 294.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 292.
52. Id. at 294.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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Although Eastlake was a case similar to SASSO, the Ohio
majority did not discuss SASSO's distinction between a referendum
and a delegation of power to a small segment of the community.
Instead, the Ohio court found that Eubank, Roberge, and Cusack
governed the Eastlake situation,55 and concluded that the referen-
dum requirement was an unconstitutional delegation of power:5"
Due process of law requires that procedures for the exercise of municipal
power be structured such that fundamental choices among competing munic-
ipal policies are resolved by a responsible organ of government. It also re-
quires that a municipality protect individuals against the arbitrary exercise
of municipal power, by assuring that fundamental policy choices . . .are
articulated by some responsible organ of municipal government. . . .The
Eastlake charter provision ignored these concepts and blatantly delegated
legislative authority, with no assurance that the result reached thereby would
be reasonable or rational.
The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that a referendum is
not a "delegation" of power. 7 It adopted SASSO's distinction be-
tween a referendum and the standardless delegations of power to a
narrow segment of the population condemned in Eubank and
Roberge.5 8 Citing the Federalist Papers,59 the Court noted that one
55. 41 Ohio St. 2d at 191-92, 324 N.E.2d at 744.
56. Id. at 196, 324 N.E.2d at 746.
Generally, state courts have not characterized referenda as delegations of power:
... [T]he power of initiative and referendum . . .is the exercise by the people of a
power reserved to them, and not the exercise of a right granted to them.
Ley v. Dominguez, 212 Cal. 587, 593, 299 P. 713, 715 (1931); accord, Taxpayers Ass'n v.
Houston, 129 Tex. 627,105 S.W.2d 655, (1937); State ex rel. Wagner v. Summers, 33 S.D. 40,
144 N.W. 730 (1913); Cutter v. Durham, 109 N.H. 33, 241 A.2d 216 (1968). A few states,
however, have viewed the referendum as a concession to an organized minority and a limita-
tion on the rights of the people. See Ferle v. Parsons, 210 Mich. 150, 177 N.W. 397 (1920);
Ley v. Dominguez, 212 Cal. 587, 593, 299 P. 713, 715 (1931). The concurring opinion of Justice
Stem of the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the Eastlake referendum procedure on the addi-
tional ground that its true purpose was exclusionary: "to build walls against the ills, poverty,
racial strife, and the people themselves, of our urban areas. . . .The inevitable effect of such
provisions is to perpetuate the de facto divisions .. .between black and white, rich and
poor." 41 Ohio St. 2d at 200-01, 324 N.E.2d at 749 (Stern, J., concurring). However, Eastlake
is not an exclusionary zoning case. Plaintiff's brief to the lower court specifically stated that
it did not base its claim on any allegation of racial or economic discrimination. Petitioner's
Brief for Certiorari at 7-8. The issue was first introduced by Amicus Curiae Lawyers for
Housing. The Ohio Supreme Court majority observed that there was no support in the record
for a finding that Eastlake's purpose was to exclude low and middle income housing. 41 Ohio
St. 2d at 198, 324 N.E.2d at 747-48.
57. 96 S. Ct. at 2361.
58. Id.
59. THE FEDERALIST, No. 39.
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of the fundamental assumptions underlying our constitutional gov-
ernment is that all power derives from the people.'" Therefore, they
may reserve to themselves the power to legislate directly on any
matters they choose."'
Having clarified the nature of a referendum, the Court considered
whether this rezoning amendment was properly subject to a referen-
dum in Ohio."2 The Ohio State Constitution reserves initiative and
referendum powers "to the people . . . on all questions which such
municipality may. . . be authorized by law to control by legislative
action." 3 The Ohio Supreme Court had expressly held that rezoning
is a legislative act. 4 The Supreme Court accepted this determina-
tion without further examination and concluded that the referen-
dum was proper under Ohio law."
The Court then considered plaintiff's contention that the manda-
tory procedure allowed the voters to exercise the police power in an
arbitrary and unreasonable manner. The majority agreed that law-
making bodies must not act arbitrarily. 7 However, the Court found
that the Ohio court had misconstrued the scope of the fourteenth
amendment and the teaching of Euclid v. Ambler in applying this
principle. The mere possibility that voters may act selfishly or
capriciously does not invalidate the referendum requirement. 9 Nei-
ther the fourteenth amendment nor Euclid requires advance assur-
ance that voters will act reasonably. 0 When elected legislators act,
there is no assurance that they will apply consistent standards.
After they legislate, however, an aggrieved party may challege the
constitutionality of their act.7 The same is true when the people
60. 96 S. Ct. at 2361.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2362.
63. OHIo CONST. art. II, § If (1955).
64. 41 Ohio St. 2d at 189, 324 N.E.2d at 743.
65. 96 S. Ct. at 2362.
66. Id. at 2362-63.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2363. The Court distinguished decisions which have held that Congress must
provide discernible standards when it delegates power to regulatory agencies which are not
directly responsible to the people. These standards serve as the measure of the agency's
fidelity to the legislative will. However, the "doctrine is inapplicable, where, as here, rather
than a delegation of power, we deal with a power reserved by the people to themselves." Id.
71. Id. Legislative acts are not easily invalidated, however. Whether enacted by legisla-
1976]
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legislate directly. The referendum itself is a valid exercise of the
people's legislative power; however, a plaintiff may attack an arbi-
trary and unreasonable result.7"
Justice Powell and Justice Stevens dissented in separate opin-
ions.73 Both argued that Eastlake's procedure was fundamentally
unfair when only one individual's property was at issue.74 In his four
sentence dissent, Justice Powell agreed that generally applicable
zoning laws are subject to a referendum.75 However, an individual
landowner has no realistic opportunity to be heard by the electo-
rate.7" He concluded that the" 'spot' referendum technique appears
ture or referendum, every law has a strong presumption of constitutionality. 1 ANDERSON,
supra note 19, § 2.14. To rebut this presumption, a plaintiff must present clear and convincing
evidence that a zoning statute or ordinance bears "no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals or general welfare." Id. § 2.17. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
72. 96 S. Ct. at 2362-63. The history of SASSO on remand is illustrative. Relying on the
Ninth Circuit's dicta that a referendum result denying decent housing to low income residents
would present a substantial constitutional question, 424 F.2d at 294, the district court ordered
the city to act within a reasonable time to provide housing for low income residents. The court
reserved the right to grant relief to SASSO if the city's failure to do so could later be described
as a denial of equal protection. No. 51950 (N.D. Cal., July 31, 1971).
73. 96 S. Ct. at 2365 (Powell, J., & Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 2365, 2371 (Powell, J., & Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 2365 (Powell, J., dissenting).
76. Id.
Every state's zoning enabling legislation includes a provision requiring notice and public
hearing before any zoning law or regulation may be enacted or amended. ANDERSON, supra
note 19, § 4.12. Because of these requirements, state courts have denied the right to enact
zoning ordinances by initiative, since to do so would circumvent these procedural safeguards.
The general rule is that the people may not have greater power to legislate than the legislature
has. See generally Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 277 P. 308 (1929); Taschner v.
City Council of Laguna Beach, 31 Cal. App. 3d 48, 107 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1973); Dewey v. Doxey-
Layton Realty Co., 3 Utah 2d 1, 277 P.2d 805 (1954); City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court,
103 Ariz. 204, 439 P.2d 290 (1968); State ex rel. Powers v. Donohue, 368 S.W.2d 432 (Mo.
Sup. Ct. 1963); Korash v. City of Livonia, 388 Mich. 737, 202 N.W.2d 803 (1972); Forman v.
Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Mkts. Inc., 89 Nev. 533, 516 P.2d 1234 (1973).
However, several California cases have held that the broad initiative powers granted to
charter cities are not restricted by the statutory procedural requirements of the zoning en-
abling act. Bayless v. Limber, 26 Cal. App. 3d 463, 469-70, 102 Cal. Rptr. 647, 650-51 (1972);
Fletcher v. Porter, 203 Cal. App. 2d 313, 322, 21 Cal. Rptr. 452, 458 (1962).
In San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n. v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118
Cal Rptr. 146 (1974), appeal dismissed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3747 (U.S. June 29, 1976), plaintiff
claimed that zoning by initiative in charter cities was unconstitutional on the grounds that
the due process clause as well as the state enabling statute mandates notice and hearing. The
California Supreme Court held that notice and hearing were purely statutory requirements.
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to open disquieting opportunities for local government bodies to by-
pass normal protective procedures for resolving issues affecting indi-
vidual rights. '77
. Justice Stevens with whom Justice Brennan joined reached the
same conclusion. Ignoring plaintiff's unlawful delegation of power
contention, he saw two critical issues in Eastlake: whether the pro-
cedure used to rezone an individual parcel of land must comply with
the due process clause and, if so, whether Eastlake's procedure did
comply.78 Based on the unique nature of zoning ordinances,"9 he
concluded that "the opportunity to apply for an amendment is an
aspect of property ownership protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment."8 Therefore, a landowner has a
right to fair procedure in the consideration of the merits of his appli-
cation."' Justice Stevens argued that Eubank and Roberge sup-
ported this conclusion.82 Noting that these cases invalidated stat-
utes for procedural reasons, he found their implied holdings to be
that procedures affecting individual rights in property must meet
constitutional standards. 3 In Justice Stevens' view, this proposition
is applicable to the Eastlake situation even though Eubank and
13 Cal. 3d at 212-13, 529 P.2d at 574, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 150. The United States Supreme Court
dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal question. San Diego Bldg. Contractors
Ass'n. v. City Council, 44 U.S.L.W. 3747 (U.S. June 29, 1976).
While most states have rejected zoning by initiative, they have upheld the right to zone or
rezone by referendum because notice and hearing are provided prior to the referendum. See,
e.g., Queen Creek Land & Cattle Corp. v. Yavapai County Bd. of Supervisors, 108 Ariz. 449,
501 P.2d 391 (1972). Justice Powell's dissent, however, seems to imply that the affected party
should have the opportunity to be heard by the ultimate decision makers, the voters. 96 S.
Ct. at 2365 (Powell, J., dissenting).
77. 96 S. Ct. at 2365 (Powell, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 2365-66. Justice Stevens noted that zoning codes are unlike any other legislation
affecting property inasmuch as they anticipate and provide for frequent exceptions and
changes. As a result, property owners expect that changes consonant with the basic zoning
plan will be granted. Id.
80. 96 S. Ct. at 2366.
81. Id. Justice Stevens rejected the majority's contention that plaintiff had a sufficient
remedy in his right to challenge an arbitrary statute after it is enacted. He stated, "if there
is a constitutional right to fundamental fairness in the procedure applicable to an ordinary
request for an amendment to the zoning applicable to an individual parcel, that right is not
vindicated by the opportunity to make a substantive due process attack on the ordinance
itself." Id. at 2371-72 n.16.
82. Id. at 2366.
83. Id.
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Roberge did not involve referendum procedures. 4
Justice Stevens also cited numerous state court cases holding that
rezoning ordinances are administrative rather than legislative acts. 5
He found this characterization more consistent with the require-
ments of the due process clause because it affords greater procedural
protections to the affected property owner and broader standards of
judicial review."6 However, the Ohio Supreme Court specifically
held that rezoning is a legislative function. 7 The Supreme Court's
acceptance of this holding led to the conclusion that the referendum
on the rezoning of plaintiff's land was proper under Ohio law. 8
However, Justice Stevens argued that the constitutional require-
ment of fair procedure cannot depend upon the label which a state
court applies:8
When we examine a state procedure for the purpose of deciding whether it
comports with the constitutional standard of due process, the fact that a
State may give it a "legislative" label should not save an otherwise invalid
procedure.
Justice Stevens did not conclude that a referendum on the rezon-
ing of a single parcel of land could never be valid. He proposed that
the test should be whether issues of community-wide policy or pub-
lic interest predominate. 0 If they do, a referendum is permissible?
If these issues are not present, it is "manifestly unreasonable" to
have private rights determined by thousands of persons who have
no individual or community interest in the outcome." Rather:93
84. Id. at n.5.
85. Id. at 2367, 2370.
86. Id. Unlike legislative acts, which have a presumption of validity, see note 71 supra,
administrative acts are subject to broad review. A court may examine whether the governing
body observed fair procedures, whether it applied statutory criteria to the evidence presented,
or whether it abused its discretion or exceeded its jurisdiction. Snyder v. City of Lakewood,
542 P.2d 371, 376 (Colo. 1975). See generally, San Diego Building Contractors Ass'n v. City
Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974), appeal dismissed, 44
U.S.L.W. 3747 (June 29, 1976); Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 575, 507 P.2d
28 (1973).
87. 41 Ohio St. 2d at 189, 324 N.E.2d at 743.
88. 96 S. Ct. at 2362.
89. Id. at 2368.
90. Id. at 2371.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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The essence of fair procedure is that the interested parties be given a reason-
able opportunity to have their dispute resolved on the merits by reference to
articulable rules. If a dispute involves only the conflicting rights of private
litigants, it is elementary that the decision-maker must be impartial and
qualified to understand and to apply the controlling rules.
Plaintiff's case in Eastlake depended entirely on its characteriza-
tion of a referendum as a delegation of power,94 a theory which had
little support in prior law. 5 If accepted, plaintiff's theory would
have undermined the validity of referenda in general since there is
no way to ensure that voters will not act arbitrarily. The Court's
rejection of plaintiff's argument was consistent with earlier deci-
sions recognizing the referendum as a time-honored instrument of
democratic government."
Plaintiff could have challenged Eastlake's procedure without
threatening the referendum as an institution of government. The
company might have attacked the validity of the legislative classifi-
cation which made the rezoning subject to a referendum. The two
dissenting opinions suggest that plaintiff could have alleged a denial
of procedural due process without asserting an unlawful delegation
of power. Both dissenting opinions actually ignored plaintiff's argu-
ment and reformulated the critical issues in the case. Justice
Stevens' argument that the Eastlake procedure did not meet consti-
tutional standards is well reasoned and persuasive. However, plain-
tiff's erroneous statement of the issue allowed the majority to avoid
considering the procedural due process question and to decide the
case on the extremely narrow ground that a referendum is not a
delegation of power." Because its holding is so narrow, the majority
opinion does not foreclose further argument and consideration of the
issues raised in the dissenting opinions.
The impact of Eastlake will depend largely upon each state's
interpretation of its own zoning statutes. Basic policy questions lie
at the core of the matter. States which favor greater accountability
of zoning boards, broader judicial review, and long-range deliberate
planning by experts and professionals can achieve these goals by
classifying the rezoning of individual parcels as administrative acts.
94. Id. at 2361.
95. See notes 40-54 supra and accompanying text.
96. Id.
97. 96 S. Ct. at 2361.
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By doing so, they preclude citizen referenda on those ordinances."
States which place greater emphasis on the people's inherent right
and ability to make the decisions which affect their lives, or which
view the referendum as a constructive counterbalance to special
interest groups and legislative corruption may enact procedures
similar to those in Eastlake. The decision to follow either course
remains entirely with the state courts and legislatures. Eastlake
does not require states to allow referenda; it does not impose any
particular zoning policy. It merely decides that to require a referen-
dum does not violate the due process clause.
Beatrice Close
98. See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
